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Essay
A Solution in Search of a Problem:
Kelo Reform Over Ten Years
WENDELL E. PRITCHETT
Kelo is NOT Dred Scott. Kelo is not only NOT Dred Scott, it was, as
this Essay will argue, the right decision given the facts of the cases and the
current state of legal jurisprudence. As an academic who has detailed the
historic exploitation of eminent domain to uproot persons of color in this
country, I find it interesting, and somewhat troubling, that the case has
received so much criticism, much more criticism, I would argue, than other
Supreme Court decisions that deserve condemnation. Certainly, eminent
domain, like any other government power, must be regulated carefully. But
upending the principles of judicial restraint and federalism is not
necessary in this case. This Essay argues that eminent domain is a
necessary tool for governments to promote the public interest, and that the
problem of potential “abuse” can be managed by less dramatic—and more
effective—methods than categorical bans on the use of condemnation.
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A Solution in Search of a Problem:
Kelo Reform Over Ten Years
WENDELL E. PRITCHETT*
Kelo is NOT Dred Scott. What perfect evidence of the hyperbolic tenor
of our current political culture that a United States Supreme Court Justice
could compare the decision that reaffirmed the right to enslave human
beings and led to the Civil War, the most violent conflagration on United
States territory in history, to a decision stating that there is no
constitutional restriction (though there could be state restrictions) on the
ability of a local government, in limited circumstances, to PAY a property
owner to acquire their land.1 The comparison screams “mountain vs. mole
hill.” Kelo is not only NOT Dred Scott, it was the right decision given the
facts of the cases and the current state of legal jurisprudence, and I write
that as a person who has detailed the historic abuses of eminent domain in
this country.2 Certainly, eminent domain, like any other government
power, must be regulated carefully. But upending the principles of judicial
restraint and federalism is not necessary in this case. I will argue in this
response to Horton and Levesque that eminent domain is a necessary tool
for governments to promote the public interest, and that the problem of
potential “abuse” can be managed by less dramatic—and more effective—
methods than categorical bans on the use of condemnation.
The authors ably analyze the historical precedent and explain the
reasons why the majority in the Kelo decision was correct.3 The decision is
well in line with existing jurisprudence. It is a logical effort at judicial
restraint. It promotes federalism in providing for more restrictive
approaches at the state level. It is an honorable effort to avoid judicial
activism. In addition, rejecting this approach and finding in favor of the
Kelo plaintiffs would have created a jurisprudential mess and required state
*
Presidential Professor of Law and Education, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
author was the Chairman of the Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia from 2009–2011 and the
President of the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation from 2008–2011.
1
See Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV.
1405, 1407 n.5 (2016) (referencing Justice Antonin Scalia’s remarks about “the Kelo decision being on
par with Dred Scott”).
2
See, e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 37–41 (2003) (recalling the increased use of
eminent domain in large cities throughout much of the mid-twentieth century).
3
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1414–27 (analyzing the Court’s decision in Kelo in
light of relevant historical precedents).
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and federal courts to supervise local redevelopment efforts in a way that
conservatives would find (I believe) very distasteful.4 So the authors are
right to defend the positions they argued in court. The conclusion they
reached is supported by case law, does not inhibit states in providing
additional restrictions, and is the philosophically conservative approach; so
then, what are the reasons for the Kelo backlash?
The crusade against eminent domain for economic development has
always been a solution in search of a problem. Where is the evidence that
eminent domain for economic development is running rampant? Despite
the flood of articles on the case, I have seen no empirical studies showing
either that eminent domain “abuse” was on the rise before Kelo, or that it
has increased since it was decided.5 What is the scope of eminent domain
in this country? Under what circumstances do local governments use
eminent domain? What is the response of property owners and other
members of the community to government eminent domain proposals?
These are basic questions to which we have few answers. Yes, such work
is time consuming, but it is not that complicated. Academics have built a
robust literature on many topics examining regulatory interactions between
the governments and their citizens.6 Why, then, have no enterprising young
scholars taken on this research? Until such research is conducted, there is
little we can say concretely about the scope of the supposed problem of
eminent domain abuse.
Yes, there is a study associated with the Institute for Justice and
produced in 2003, which helped start the national movement against
eminent domain. It found that “private condemnation” (properties to be
taken by eminent domain and transferred to private parties) notices had
been filed for over 3,722 properties in the five years leading up to the
Id. at 1418–19.
The lack of such evidence is especially noteworthy considering that literature on Kelo is
voluminous. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1415 (2006) (arguing that Kelo was rightly decided); Dana Berliner, Looking
Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 84 (July 7, 2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/looking-back-ten-years-after-kelo [https://perma.cc/5M4J-RSGD] (assessing Kelo’s state-level
effects); James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 127, 129, 131 (2009) (arguing that Kelo represented an unwarranted expansion of the
“public use” requirement of the Takings Clause); Ilya Somin, What if Kelo v. City of New London Had
Gone the Other Way?, 45 IND. L. REV. 21, 21 (2011) (considering a world in which Kelo had been
decided the other way and the effects it would have had on existing property rights).
6
For example, many scholars have examined how healthcare regulation has shaped the
interaction of the public with our healthcare system. See, e.g., Deven McGraw, Paving the Regulatory
Road to the “Learning Health Care System”, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 75 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://
www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/learning-health-care-system [https://perma.cc/XH
E2-RDUC] (suggesting that healthcare regulations serve as a disincentive to improving the healthcare
system); William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 138–41 (examining the interaction between market forces and regulation in
shaping the organization of the healthcare sector over a thirty-year span).
4
5
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study. Another 6,560-plus were “threatened.” While these seem like large
numbers, consider that (according to the National Association of Realtors)
as of 2013 the country had approximately 115 million residential units and
5.6 million commercial units.9 In addition, putting aside the self-interested
nature of that study (they were the lawyers for the plaintiff), this study does
not attempt to examine the question of change over time. The authors
certainly find, and highlight, examples where local governments have used
condemnation for projects where the chances of success were speculative
at best. The report also documents that eminent domain is used in
jurisdictions across the country. But two examples from each state over a
period of ten years do not constitute a crisis. Nor have the ten years since
the decision brought the decline of property in this country. Motel 6’s
continue to open, free from the fear that they will become a Ritz-Carlton.10
In the immediate post-Kelo years there was a flurry of legislative
activity. Many states passed laws “restricting” the use of eminent domain
within their territory. However, Ilya Somin, who has studied this issue
more intensely than any other academic, tells us that the majority of these
laws are weak and will have little impact.11 Many of them ban the use of
eminent domain solely for purposes of economic development, but they
maintain vague definitions of blight that would encompass almost any
property, allowing its condemnation.12 As a result, Somin concludes that
these laws do not actually protect property owners from condemnation.13
Why, given the backlash, aren’t these laws stronger? Somin argues the
nature of our political system is such that the public cannot understand, and
therefore cannot demand reform of, complicated issues.14
But maybe the laws were symbolic because the issue was one of
symbolism, an effort of legislators to respond to an “Astroturf”15 campaign
7

8

7
DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (2003), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ED_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WMK-DQNN].
8
Id.
9
Field Guide to Quick Real Estate Statistics, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/
field-guides/field-guide-to-quick-real-estate-statistics [https://perma.cc/LMJ4-GK8Q] (last updated
Mar. 21, 2016).
10
According to its website, as of the time of this Essay there are approximately 1,200 Motel 6
locations. About, MOTEL 6, https://www.motel6.com/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/XG5Y-MPTY]
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
11
ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. THE CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 136–37, 141 (2015).
12
Id. at 84–86.
13
Id.
14
Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2100, 2163 (2009).
15
Gerry Mackie, Astroturfing Infotopia, 56 THEORIA 30, 32 (2009) (“Astroturfing is the use of
paid agents to create falsely the impression of popular sentiment (the grass-roots are fake, thus the term
astroturf, which is artificial grass.)”).
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that used the plight of a particularly sympathetic plaintiff, Suzette Kelo, to
foment anger about a little known and poorly understood government tool,
eminent domain. Perhaps state legislators, no doubt lobbied by “real estate
interests” and “power-hungry local officials,” decided that eminent domain
is a necessary tool of governance and that to significantly restrict local
powers would have potentially significant negative side-effects.
How often is eminent domain used by local governments to take a
well-maintained property and give it to a developer in the pursuit of
economic growth? In essence how big a problem are we talking about
here? We don’t know. And therefore we don’t know what the problem is
that we’re trying to solve. In most areas, we conduct research before
making policy recommendations. But in this case emotion has
overwhelmed empirical study.
To date the most nuanced assessment of eminent domain in this
country, Debbie Becher’s Private Property and Public Power: Eminent
Domain in Philadelphia, presents a very different view of the eminent
domain process than reformers would like us to see.16 Through a
comprehensive review of the use of eminent domain in Philadelphia from
1992 to 2007, Becher helps us understand how eminent domain decisions
are made, contested, and implemented in one large city.17 Becher certainly
finds problems with many aspects of the process, but she does not discover
a government set on uprooting people from their homes, and she does not
find a groundswell of protest against government condemnation efforts,
even when they involve transferring condemned property to other private
owners.18
Over the period Becher studied, Philadelphia began the process of
taking 6,880 properties (a number similar to that which, in a much shorter
period, the Institute for Justice chronicled for the whole country in their
report) and completed the process for 4,320.19 Like many others after their
industrial eras, the city witnessed a large population loss in the second half
of the twentieth century, and possessed thousands of vacant houses and
parcels of land.20 Beginning with the administration of Mayor Edward G.
Rendell, and expanding with the term of Mayor John Street, who initiated
the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, the city engaged a major
condemnation effort, an effort that was largely responsible for
Pennsylvania’s high position among eminent domain “abusers” in the 2003
16
DEBBIE BECHER, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC POWER: EMINENT DOMAIN IN
PHILADELPHIA 11 (2014) (explaining that private citizens often view eminent domain positively).
17
Id. at 22.
18
Id. at 10.
19
Id. at 58; BERLINER, supra note 7, at 179–80.
20
For background on Philadelphia’s industrial decline, see GUIAN A. MCKEE, THE PROBLEM OF
JOBS: LIBERALISM, RACE, AND DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN PHILADELPHIA 12–13 (2008).
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Institute for Justice Report.
In the period Becher studied, condemnation efforts totaled almost one
percent of the total number of properties in the city (540,000).22 Yet, this
effort did not create a groundswell of opposition. Of the 4,320 properties in
which eminent domain was completed, Becher found that only 240
property owners (or six percent) contested the taking.23 In the
overwhelming majority of takings, the property owners accepted the
process, and the community did not complain. The major reason for this
tepid response was that most of the properties taken were vacant.24 Sixtyfour percent of the properties taken (2,760 of 4,320) were empty lots.25
Only eight percent (340) of the properties were occupied.26 Philadelphia
officials, cognizant of the history of eminent domain in neighborhoods of
color as well as the disruptive effects of dislocation, targeted their efforts
on properties that were unoccupied and were having a negative impact on
the residents in these communities.27
In addition, contrary to the presentation of eminent domain as a means
to enrich the elite and take property away from ordinary citizens, the taken
properties were typically used for affordable housing or small-scale
business. Forty-seven percent of the projects that received condemned
properties were affordable housing projects, fifty-eight percent of the
commercial projects involved expansions of businesses that abutted the
properties taken.28 A significant number of projects supported the
expansion of local churches, social service agencies, and health care
agencies.29 These community-based entities were not looking to profit on
the backs of the poor, they were seeking to expand their services to the
community. In fact, ninety-eight percent of the development occurred in
21

BECHER, supra note 16, at 58; BERLINER, supra note 7, at 179–80.
BECHER, supra note 16, at 58. The total number of properties in the city at the time was
540,000. Id.
23
See id. (“[V]ery few of these property takings met any official resistance. Owners of only 240
of the 4,320 (6 percent) taken properties lodged any kind of official contestation, through litigation or
revestment.”).
24
See id. at 67–68 (“The vast majority of properties taken . . . were vacant. . . . To some extent,
the low frequency of resistance to takings overall was due to the fact that most properties taken were in
devastated neighborhoods, were vacant of occupants, and often had no buildings at all.”).
25
Id. at 67.
26
See id. (“A full 92 percent, or 3,990, of the over 4,320 properties taken for private reuse were
vacant.”).
27
See id. at 65, 67 (“Overall, Philadelphia restricted eminent domain to its most problematic
neighborhoods. . . . The vast majority of properties taken between 1992 and 2007 were vacant. . . .
Government was twice as likely to encounter formal opposition for taking an occupied property as for
taking a vacant one.”).
28
See id. at 69–70 (“Affordable housing projects accounted for 47 percent of the total
projects . . . . Most of the commercial projects and institutional projects—58 percent and 71 percent,
respectively—were expansions into vacant lots that abutted current operations.”).
29
See id. at 70 (“Institutional projects, which made up 11 percent of the projects, generally served
preexisting churches, social services, community centers, and healthcare organizations.”).
21
22
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Examining all this evidence, Becher

Despite the warnings of judges, journalists, and activists, my
research shows that in at least one large city, the taking of
functioning businesses and homes for higher-intensity
development is actually quite rare, and officials generally
avoid cases that would so readily strike most Americans as
an abuse of government power.31
A significant portion of our urban infrastructure is more than a century
old.32 Houses and neighborhoods that were once desirable have
deteriorated. This causes major problems for the people living in
neighboring properties, for communities as a whole, and for local
governments—problems that necessitate government action. Local leaders
are not power-hungry despots eager to dislocate little old ladies. Rather,
they are struggling administrators attempting to respond to public demands
for improvement in their communities, even when that same public refuses
to pay for such improvements. As Horton and Levesque tell us:
City councilors who vote for an unpopular condemnation are
likely to be voted out of office, especially since in the usual
situation the taxpayers have to pay for the property
condemned. The decision in New London was made after
long and public discussions. It was not a cozy backroom deal
with a developer out to make a financial killing.33
Such was the case in Philadelphia, where eminent domain continues.34
The authors are generous. Despite their clear victory, they are willing
to explore how reforms might create more tailored and efficient eminent
domain decision-making procedures.35 Their suggestions are good
regarding how the public should distinguish between good and bad uses of
condemnation, and they would productively be added to state laws guiding
state judges. There is no need to go back to the U.S. Supreme Court; Kelo
is sound law. Though I do not have empirical evidence to support this
30
See id. at 65 (“[98] percent of all taken properties were located in neighborhoods with very
serious problems . . . .”).
31
Id. at 75.
32
See AMER. SOC’Y CIV. ENGINEERS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 65–
67
(2016),
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/home
[https://perma.cc/K8FN-7GX9]
(demonstrating the degeneration of American urban infrastructure).
33
Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1425.
34
See Pritchett, supra note 2, at 51 (“The city of Philadelphia . . . is currently considering a major
‘Neighborhood Transformation Initiative,’ which aims to clear large areas of the city’s most dilapidated
housing in the hope that the cleared land will attract private development.”).
35
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1425–27 (proposing clarifications to Justice
Kennedy’s Kelo test).
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statement, I think, given the intensity of emotion on the issues, that it is
likely that local government officials are much more reticent to use this
approach today than they were ten years ago. Until we have a clear
understanding that eminent domain abuse is a problem, the current state of
the law is the best approach.
I am not arguing that eminent domain is never used in an illegal
manner, or that regulation is not important, particularly to protect persons
of color. During the period in American history where the largest amount
of condemnation occurred, the targets were mostly African-Americans and
other people of color (along with some poor whites) whose presence in
cities, elites felt, threatened their economic future.36 We do have some
empirical data on the urban renewal era, and it concludes that almost two
million inhabitants were uprooted by urban renewal from 1949 to 1973
(including condemnations for the public housing and highway programs). 37
There is no record of how many persons of color were uprooted nationally,
but it was certainly several hundred thousand. It is known that more than
one hundred thousand persons of color were uprooted in New York City
alone.38 Even though many of the properties taken through urban renewal
programs were well-maintained,39 the blight designation was the primary
vehicle by which the law allowed exceptions to the general expectation
(not the law, but certainly the general rule) that government would not use
eminent domain to take one owner’s property and give it to another.
Although the urban renewal program is no more, property designated as
blighted remains vulnerable. Additionally, these properties continue to be
owned or occupied disproportionately by persons of color.40 But the
36
See Pritchett, supra note 2, at 38 (“Robert Weaver (later to become the first HUD Secretary)
argued that urban renewal presented a ‘threat or an opportunity’ to African-Americans. He worried that
the program would be used to entrench racial segregation and prevent blacks from moving into new
areas.” (footnote omitted)).
37
See Urban Renewal, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Urban_renewal.
aspx [https://perma.cc/T6BL-B5JS] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (“More than two thousand construction
projects on one thousand square miles of urban land were undertaken between 1949 and 1973, when
the urban renewal program official ended. Roughly six hundred thousand housing units were
demolished, compelling some two million inhabitants to move. . . . In New York City, more than one
hundred thousand African Americans were uprooted, destroying the social and economic fabric of
many neighborhoods.”).
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 2, at 34 (“New York Life created a controversy when it
demanded that several well-maintained blocks be cleared because they would afford the project better
views of the lake. Even redevelopment advocates acknowledged that the plan ignored ‘actual slum
areas completely’ and planned ‘the demolition of a well-kept Negro area where the bulk of property is
resident owned, its taxes paid, and its maintenance above par.’”).
40
See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, EVICTED FROM THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE
REDEVELOPMENT OF MOUNT HOLLY GARDENS 4 (2008), http://www.njeminentdomain.com/uploads/
file/PubAdvocate_gardens_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X24-3KN6] (“Various sources of data dating
from the year 2000 or later reveal the recent demographics of Mount Holly Gardens. During this
period, the residents fell almost entirely within the low-to-moderate-income range—forty-seven percent
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question is: what are the best mechanisms to protect those who might be
unfairly targeted?
Take the case of Mount Holly, New Jersey. There the city has
undertaken a decade long effort to clear a long-established majority black
community.41 In 2002, the Township of Mount Holly, a small community
in the New Jersey suburbs outside of Philadelphia, designated the Mount
Holly Gardens neighborhood as blighted and set in motion a plan that
would uproot more than 1,000 people.42 Built in the mid-1950s for military
personnel serving at Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base, the 379 twostory attached units were some of the only affordable housing in the
township.43 While Mount Holly is overwhelmingly white, Mount Holly
Gardens was, in 2000, forty-four percent African-American and twentytwo percent Hispanic.44 Furthermore, the majority of the residents were
poor, with incomes below $20,000 annually.45 By the 1970s, the units,
which were originally owned by the Federal Housing Agency, had been
sold to owner-occupants and absentee landlords, many of whom failed to
maintain the properties.46 During the 1980s, parts of the neighborhood
became locations for drug dealing and other crime.47 In response to these
problems, the township declared that 327 units should be acquired and that
the neighborhood should be redeveloped for new housing.48 In 2002,
Mount Holly Gardens was designated as blighted.49 The township
subsequently issued a redevelopment plan; however, the plan was vague as
to how much and what types of housing should be acquired.50
Although the redevelopment designation authorized the township to
condemn the properties within the redevelopment area, the township chose
to negotiate voluntarily with the property owners.51 By 2008, the township

of the households earned less than $20,000 per year; forty-three percent earned between $20,000 and
$40,000; nine percent earned more than $40,000; and 0.7% earned more than $60,000. . . . Of the 1,605
individuals who lived in the Gardens at the time of the 2000 census, forty-four percent were African
American, [and] twenty-two percent were Hispanic . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
41
See id. at 16–17 (“By September 2006, when the Township filed its Workable Relocation
Assistance Plan, its intentions were clear: ‘In order to permit the redevelopment of the area in
accordance with the goals of the redevelopment plan, the Township intends to acquire all the units in
the Mount Holly Gardens, which will necessitate the relocation of its residents.’”).
42
See id. at 16 (“The threat of displacement has loomed over Gardens residents since October
2002, when the Township designated the area as ‘blighted.’”).
43
Id. at 4–5.
44
Id. at 4.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 5.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 24.
49
Id. at 4, 6.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 9, 17–18.
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had acquired 232 of the units. Homeowners were offered what the
township determined to be market rates for their properties, and many were
offered relocation assistance in the form of no-interest loans ranging from
$15,000 to $20,000 to purchase a new home.53 The prices that the township
offered as market rates ranged between $27,000 and $49,000, depending
on the size of the acquired unit.54 Some, but not all, of the tenants of the
acquired buildings were offered relocation assistance of up to $7,500.55
High among the many challenges residents faced was the fact that
there were very few units for sale or rent in Mount Holly at comparable
prices to the sale or rental prices of the units acquired.56 Identical units
outside of the redevelopment area were sold for $82,000 to $99,900.57 The
average listing price for a house in Mount Holly at the time was
$279,985.58 The redevelopment plan was constantly changing, but by 2008
it envisioned the development of 520 units for homeownership or rental.59
Of these, fifty-six would be classified as affordable, and only eleven of
those would be offered to residents of the neighborhood whose units were
demolished.60
Different problems faced those who chose not to sell. The township
quickly began demolishing the homes that it acquired, many of which were
attached to still-occupied homes.61 By 2008, the township had demolished
seventy-five homes.62 The township tore up sidewalks and driveways,
closed neighborhood facilities, and turned off electricity to many of the
streetlights.63 The remaining residents lived in what had quickly turned
from a busy community into a ghost town.64 The township’s actions, not
surprisingly, spurred additional residents to sell and vacate the
community.65
In 2003, many of the residents hired South Jersey Legal Services,
52

Id. at 18.
See id. at 9 (explaining the relocation assistance provided to the residents of Mount Holly
Gardens).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 13.
56
Id. at 9–11.
57
Id. at 9.
58
Id. at 11.
59
Id. at 24.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 18–19.
62
Id. at 6.
63
Dan Wang, New Jersey Town Rips Up Working-Class Neighborhood for Private Developers,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2012, 2:06 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/01/new-jerseydevelopment-mount-holly-gardens_n_1723746.html [https://perma.cc/T2TL-RJD7].
64
See id. (characterizing the exodus from Mount Holly Gardens and discussing the township’s
demolition activities).
65
See id. (describing the collateral effects of the township’s decision to demolish portions of
Mount Holly Gardens).
52
53
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which brought a lawsuit alleging that the Mount Holly Gardens
redevelopment plan violated the Fair Housing Act by having a
discriminatory impact on persons of color in the community. 66 A federal
district court judge dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs had
not shown that the township was guilty of intentional racial
discrimination.67 However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court, ruling that the plaintiffs had provided enough statistical
evidence to show that the redevelopment plan had a discriminatory impact
on persons of color.68
The township appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but in 2013, the
parties settled, and the township agreed to provide replacement housing to
some dislocated residents and increased relocation payments to other
residents.69 Both parties had an incentive to settle. By that time, the
township had incurred $18 million in costs for the redevelopment plan,
even though nothing had been built, and the town was facing a significant
budget deficit.70 The plaintiffs settled the case in fear that the U.S.
Supreme Court would reverse the Third Circuit ruling.71
As the Mount Holly case shows, eminent domain can still be used to
uproot communities of color. However, as the resolution of this case
shows, the law provides avenues to defend communities against local
governments seeking to use the power of condemnation to eliminate them.
While much damage was done to Mount Holly Gardens during the ten
years of this dispute, the settlement provides a mechanism for at least
partial rebuilding of this community and the incorporation of the residents
who were there when the process began. In addition, the victory of the
66
Jesse Kearney, Pressure to Settle: The Mount Holly Settlement, Disparate Impact and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.racialjusticeproject.com/
pressure-to-settle/ [https://perma.cc/Q74K-UL94]; see also Wang, supra note 63 (stating that Mount
Holly Gardens had the highest concentration of minorities in the township and that the township’s
actions related to housing had a disparate impact on minorities).
67
Mount Holly Citizens v. Twp. Mount Holly, No. 08-2584 (NLH)(JS), 2011 WL 9405, at *1
(D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2011).
68
See Mount Holly Gardens Citizens v. Twp. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011)
(stating that data from the 2000 census indicates that demolition of the Mount Holly Gardens would
have a far greater impact on minority households in comparison to white households); Kearney, supra
note 66.
69
Adam Liptak, Fair Housing Case Is Settled Before It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-supre
me-court.html [https://perma.cc/F8K2-GVXD].
70
Adam Serwer, Bulldozing Homes and Civil Rights in Mount Holly, NJ, GRIO (Nov. 5, 2013,
2:30 PM) http://thegrio.com/2013/11/05/bulldozing-homes-and-civil-rights-in-mount-holly-nj/ [https://
perma.cc/A6YB-23KC].
71
See Adam Serwer, Mount Holly Settlement Spares Fair Housing Act—For Now, MSNBC (Nov.
14, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/mount-holly-settlement-spares-fair-housing-actfor-now [https://perma.cc/GL2Y-YNU3] (stating that the settlement agreement “deprive[d] the
conservative dominated Supreme Court of the opportunity to weaken the Fair Housing Act”).

2016]

KELO REFORM OVER TEN YEARS

1495

residents in this case is notice to other governments considering similar
actions that involve the use of eminent domain.
Furthermore, over the past few years other legal and regulatory
structures have evolved to provide further protection for communities
facing the discriminatory use of eminent domain. In February 2013, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a ruling
titled “The Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory
Effects Standard.”72 The rule, meant to clarify the application of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) to cases in which the plaintiffs alleged the actions of a
defendant had a “discriminatory effect,” lays out a three-part process by
which HUD evaluates such claims.73 In essence, the rule is a burdenshifting process, requiring plaintiffs to provide prima facie evidence of
discriminatory effect, which can be rebutted by proof by the defendant that
its actions are necessary to achieve “substantial legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests.”74 The plaintiff may still establish liability by
showing that the interest could be promoted by practices with less of a
discriminatory effect.75 Applying this framework to the Mount Holly
Gardens case, it is likely that the residents could have proven both
discriminatory effect and that the township could have eliminated the
blighted conditions with other approaches that would have allowed the
residents to remain. This rule, which relied on and amplified the
interpretations of federal appeals courts across the country, provides
significant support in situations such as Mount Holly Gardens.76
Furthermore, in January 2015, in a decision that surprised many, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a finding of disparate impact was sufficient
to prove a violation of the FHA. In the case, Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project,77 the Court
interpreted the phrase “or otherwise make unavailable” in the FHA to
mean that if a defendant’s actions had the result of adversely affecting a
protected group, such activities violated the FHA if they were “artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”78 The decision, based partly on
HUD’s prior rule making on the issue, provides additional protection for
residents vulnerable to racially motivated local development efforts.
Finally, in June 2015, HUD issued a final rule clarifying the
72
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department’s enforcement of the FHA’s “Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing” requirement.79 HUD revised the rule to “equip communities that
receive HUD funding with data and tools to help them meet long-standing
fair housing obligations in their use of HUD funds.”80 Historically all
communities receiving HUD support were required to show that their
activities furthered fair housing goals, but for many years this rule was
vague and not enforced. Under the new rules, HUD will work with
recipients to gather information and create a streamlined process to “help
communities analyze challenges to fair housing choice and establish their
own goals and priorities to address the fair housing barriers in their
community.”81 The rule was vehemently criticized by Republicans in
Congress.82 However, HUD officials view it as a means to focus local
attention on the many local development activities that promote
segregation or impede racial integration.83 Each of these legal tools
provides additional protection to the people most likely to be subject to
eminent domain “abuse.” They are the appropriate mechanisms to rein in
the inappropriate use of condemnation.
The attorneys who represented the City of New London in Kelo have
had a difficult decade. The Kelo decision provided an excellent opportunity
to rally public anger against government—not a hard thing to do in these
contentious times. But the claim that governments cannot be trusted with
the power to condemn property lacks empirical proof. Until it does, efforts
to “reform” eminent domain in the United States will struggle to gain
traction, and supporters of a limited and targeted use of eminent domain
like Horton and Levesque will continue to prevail.

79
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Announces Final Rule on Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing (July 8, 2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases
_media_advisories/2015/HUDNo_15-084 [https://perma.cc/B7B9-VHAE].
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Stanley Kurtz, Attention America’s Suburbs: You Have Just Been Annexed, NAT’L REV. (July
20, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/421389/attention-americas-suburbs-you-have-justbeen-annexed-stanley-kurtz [https://perma.cc/HB46-2T8Q].
83
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 79.

